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Thinking Broadly: This Volume as a Guide for Abolitionists
ADAM LEE
On 15 March 2019, the Journal of Law and Social Policy (JLSP) held “Detained: From
Supporting Prisoners to Abolishing Prisons,” a day-long symposium on prisoner support and
prison abolition. Framed as a space for lawyers, law students, activists, organizers, and
community members alike to come together and learn about prisons from one another, the event
ran as a series of panels on a wide variety of topics from nine o’clock in the morning until past
ten o’clock at night.
A year and a half earlier, a government official gave a guest lecture at Osgoode Hall Law
School about prison conditions. After discussing at length the horrors of solitary confinement
and other harms created by prisons, a question came from a student: if prisons are sites of
rampant human rights abuses, why privilege the existence of prisons at all by attempting to
reform them as opposed to abolishing them? The official responded that society needs prisons in
order to function. Prisons must be reformed and made more humane for the people inside them,
the official concluded, but because society needs prisons, the line is drawn at ending them.
With this response still in our minds, we—as student editors—were unsure how a
conversation about abolition would be received. At the same time, the official’s response proved
to us that we needed to force a conversation about abolition at Osgoode and in legal education
more broadly. We wanted to challenge the default paradigm espoused by many that the problem
with prisons is that they execute their function poorly. To the contrary, the argument running
through the symposium (and which runs through the articles presented in this volume) is that the
carceral state functions exactly as it is intended. The violence in this system cannot be reformed
away; it persists because it is designed to be so.
The symposium had been planned primarily by a committee within the JLSP editorial
team over the course of several months. In a pivotal moment during our very first meeting as an
organizing team the September before, a question was raised: “How big do we want this event to
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be?” The concept of an event about prisons had been floated in the previous year as a lunchtime
panel discussion. But whether we went ahead with a lunchtime panel or decided upon another
format begged the question of scope: how much do we want to cover about prisons, and how
long would we need to cover it?
As the discussion about our interests in abolition went around the room, the sheer amount
of ground that abolition covers became increasingly apparent. Prisons are obviously implicated
in abolition, but what about “administrative” forms of detention, like psychiatric detention and
immigration detention? What about pre-trial detention, before a judgement has even been
rendered? What about state institutions that constitute punishment and imprisonment? And of
course, how can we talk about any of these forms of detention without first discussing their root
causes: settler-colonialism, capitalism, and border sovereignty among them? When the carceral
state—Canada’s reliance upon punishment, incarceration, criminalization, and other functions of
carcerality to carry out its state-building projects—is everywhere, how can a conversation about
abolition stop short of going everywhere?
Refusing to reduce abolition to any one dimension, what began as a lunchtime panel
discussion eventually became the wide-ranging series of interwoven conversations at
“Detained.” However, the variety of topics covered in the symposium and in this volume speaks
less to our planning and more to the beauty of abolition itself and the centuries of abolitionist
work that have preceded us.
Abolition is far from a novel concept. With roots in what Dylan Rodriguez characterizes
as “a Black genealogy of revolt and transformative insurgency against racial chattel enslavement
and the transatlantic trafficking of captive Africans,”1 abolition traces its centuries-long history
through the Haitian Revolution and the abolition of the transatlantic trade of enslaved persons. 2
Amna Akbar further clarifies that prison abolition “is the unfinished project of abolishing
slavery”; a project that rejects “the moral legitimacy of confining people in cages” and all related
forms of punitive, criminal control and surveillance.3 Importantly, prison abolition is by and
large the domain of Black feminist activists, organizers, and scholars, from Angela Davis and
Ruth Wilson Gilmore to organizations like INCITE! and Critical Resistance.
When understood within these ongoing histories of resistance, abolition comes to light as,
fundamentally, praxis. As Gilmore writes, “[a]bolition requires that we change one thing:
everything.”4 The abolition of systems is not theoretical; rather, it makes change incumbent upon
all of us, wherever we find ourselves. Throughout both the symposium and this volume,
abolition is considered as an active struggle for a better world: a world free from the settlercolonial, oppressive logics, and institutions of the carceral state.
This introduction explores various dimensions of abolitionist struggle in conversation
with the articles that have been published in this volume. This introduction aims to be a further
contextualization for abolition, the symposium, and the articles herein.
Dylan Rodriguez, “Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword” (2019) 132 Harv L Rev 1575 at 1576.
Herbert Aptheker, “Militant Abolitionism” (1941) 26:4 Journal of Negro History 438 at 441-43.
3
Amna A Akbar, “Toward a Radical Imagination of Law” (2018) 93 NYUL Rev 405 at 461-62.
4
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Change Everything: Racial Capitalism and the Case for Abolition (Chicago: Haymarket
Books, forthcoming 2021). See <www.haymarketbooks.org/books/1597-change-everything> [perma.cc/AP2PJRCT].
1
2
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I. ABOLISH SETTLER-COLONIALISM:
“INTERGENERATIONAL IMPRISONMENT”
As a capitalist, settler-colonial state built upon the conversion of Indigenous land into resource
and the genocide of Indigenous peoples and nations, Canada uses carceral institutions as a key
part of its ongoing colonial strategy. The North-West Mounted Police, now known as the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, were created to clear Indigenous people from their land as the
Canadian state expanded westward by policing their movement and putting them in prisons.5 The
criminalization of Indigenous people was, and still is, a way for the Canadian state to control and
weaken Indigenous communities and sovereign Indigenous nations. 6
Vicki Chartrand and Robert Nichols both argue that in this sense, the prison system is not
a carryover of Canada’s “colonial past” but rather a crucial part of the ongoing project of settlercolonialism in present day. 7 For Chartrand, the rise in Indigenous incarceration following World
War II represents a “shift” from one method of settler-colonial eradication of Indigenous Peoples
(segregation and assimilation) to another (the prison system). 8 Nichols further clarifies that this
shift was not from a “violent” form of settler-colonialism to a more “docile” form, but that the
prison system is itself part of a “shadow system of hard infrastructure” that sustains the state’s
agenda of settler-colonial violence against Indigenous people and nations9—since Indigenous
Peoples represent a fundamental challenge to the sovereignty of the settler state, 10 Indigenous
people, cultures, and nations must be destroyed, 11 and incarceration is one tool used to achieve
that end. Both of these can be true: there can be a “shift” in how settler-colonial violence is
enacted upon Indigenous people and nations without a “shift” in degrees of violence.
This is not to say that the anti-Indigenous violence of prisons is necessarily a function of
how many Indigenous people they contain. Nichols argues that to interpret Indigenous
incarceration as a matter of statistics alone strips incarceration from the historical context of state
power, colonialism, and settler sovereignty.12 Nevertheless, inasmuch as numbers can illustrate
the sheer magnitude of the carceral state’s anti-Indigenous violence, we can see these policies of
settler-colonial control reflected in the presence of Indigenous people in provincial jails and
Canadian prisons. Despite Indigenous people making up 5 per cent of the general population,

Jaskiran K Dhillon, “Indigenous girls and the violence of colonial policing” (2015) 4:2 Decolonization:
Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 at 8.
6
Ibid.
7
Vicki Chartrand, “Unsettled Times: Indigenous Incarceration and the Links between Colonialism and the
Penitentiary in Canada” (2019) 61:3 Can J Corr 67 at 79; Robert Nichols, “The Colonialism of Incarceration” (2014)
17:2 Radical Philosophy Review 435 at 448.
8
Chartrand, supra note 7 at 77.
9
Nichols, supra note 7 at 448.
10
Ibid at 445; Eve Tuck & K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor” (2012) 1:1 Decolonization:
Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 at 6.
11
Tuck & Yang, ibid.
12
Nichols, supra note 7 at 444.
5
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over 30 per cent of federal prisoners are Indigenous, with Indigenous women making up 42 per
cent of all women in federal prisons.13
The role of the prison in racialized and Indigenous incarceration connects with Angela
Davis’s characterization of incarceration as “a fate reserved for ‘evildoers’”:
Because of the persistent power of racism, “criminals” and “evildoers” are, in the
collective imagination, fantasized as people of color. The prison therefore functions
ideologically as an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited, relieving us of
the responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities from
which prisoners are drawn in such disproportionate numbers.14
The framing of prisons as repositories for “undesirables” underscores the destruction of
Indigenous people and nations under settler-colonialism and the oppression of Black and
racialized people as part of Canada’s state-building project. Incarceration’s role as settlercolonial violence is in one sense to act as a storehouse for those whose existences contradict
what Harsha Walia refers to as “the [settler] nation-state’s normative heteropatriarchal
whiteness.”15 The settler ideal of a society whose hegemonic citizen is white, male, propertied,
and “civilized” creates the conditions and justifications for state violence against those who fall
outside its ideal: in particular, poor people, Black people, Indigenous people, racialized people,
LGBTQ2S+ people, migrants, those with mental illness(es), and people who exist at the
intersection of these and other identities. In another sense, the state uses incarceration to
specifically destroy Indigeneity through prisons as “an abstract site into which undesirables are
deposited,” connecting to long-standing colonial tactics of separating Indigenous people from
their peoples, lands, and cultures. 16In her contribution to this volume, “Intergenerational
Imprisonment: Resistance and Resilience in Indigenous Communities,” Linda Mussell confronts
these colonial realities of the carceral state. She traces the histories of state violence against
Indigenous people beyond prisons and into the broader genocidal, assimilative settler-colonial
project as enacted through residential schools, the child welfare system and the Sixties Scoop,
segregated hospitals, and prisons. By drawing out four overlapping themes between these
institutions (as Mussell describes: “(1) the removal of people from communities; (2) restriction
of freedom and movement, and coercion by those invested with power to do so; (3) both visible
Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Indigenous People in Federal Custody surpasses 30%:
Correctional Investigator issues Statement and Challenge” (21 January 2020) online: Office of the Correctional
Investigator <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/comm/press/press20200121-eng.aspx> [perma.cc/HM26-3FWH].
14
Angela Y Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003) at 16.
15
Harsha Walia, Undoing Border Imperialism (Oakland: AK Press, 2013) at 36.
16
See: Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism”
(2005) 40:4 Government and Opposition 597; Raven Sinclair, “The Indigenous Child Removal System in Canada:
An Examination of Legal Decision-making and Racial Bias” (2016) 11:2 First Peoples Child & Family Review 8;
Shandra Spears, “Strong Spirit, Fractured Identity: An Ojibway Adoptee’s Journey to Wholeness” in Martin J
Cannon & Lina Sunseri, eds, Racism, Colonialism, and Indigeneity in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2011) 127; Nico Trocmé et al, “Pathways to the Overrepresentation of Aboriginal Children in Canada’s Child
Welfare System” (2004) 78:4 Social Science Review 577; Autumn Varley, “‘You Don’t Just Get Over What Has
Happened to You’: Story Sharing, Reconciliation, and Grandma’s Journey in the Child Welfare System” (2016)
11:2 First Peoples Child & Family Review 69; and see generally the two issues of the special volume, “ReImagining Child Welfare Systems in Canada,” (2018) 28 J L & Soc Pol’y.
13
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and invisible rehabilitation to values determined by those who impose imprisonment; and (4)
ongoing resilience and resistance”), Mussell widens the scope of “imprisonment” beyond the
criminal justice system and into the entire project of state control over Indigenous people. These
forms of imprisonment and the trauma they have inflicted upon Indigenous people echo over
time and across generations. All of this provides the context for Mussell’s key claim that
“intergenerational imprisonment of Indigenous people should not be viewed as an isolated trend,
but rather as an ongoing pattern characterized by historical trauma that is rooted in multiple
persisting institutional sites of imprisonment.”
Attempts to address the intergenerational impacts of imprisonment through the criminal
justice system have fallen short. Mussell argues that the Gladue principles, derived from the
landmark R v Gladue decision and meant to ameliorate the criminal justice system’s
disproportionate punishment of Indigenous people, are deployed inconsistently and fail to
positively address the social problems arising from other government policies on Indigenous
people. Other attempts, like the Indigenous Justice Program, only serve to reproduce colonial
power when control is placed in the hands of the state.
As an alternative, Mussell turns to the calls for transformative change made by the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to advocate
for Indigenous-led responses to intergenerational imprisonment—ones that centre lived
experiences and Indigenous histories. Only through Indigenous control and self-determination
can responses to intergenerational imprisonment break from colonialism and achieve
transformative change.
Colonialism’s lingering presence within state-given solutions to intergenerational
imprisonment suggests that transformative change is necessarily incompatible with settlercolonialism. As the animating force behind intergenerational imprisonment, settler-colonialism is
itself the violence that harms Indigenous people across generations. The settler-colonial state’s
centring of itself comes with little regard for how deeply the institutions of colonial destruction
are embedded within its practices. At the symposium session on Racialized and Indigenous
Incarceration, panellist Ricky Atkinson connected his own family history of criminalization with
colonialism, while Kyle King spoke of colonialism as ongoing within institutions that, despite
what they say, continue to fail Black and Indigenous communities time and time again.
Residential school survivor Michael Cheena made explicit that there can be no “reconciliation”
without the return of Indigenous control of land. The end of imprisonment—not just prisons, but
the entire carceral state—must come with Indigenous control and self-determination, or it will be
destined to reproduce colonialism’s violence.

II. THINKING BEYOND PRISONS: “DETAINING THE
UNCOOPERATIVE MIGRANT” AND “NO ONE IS
DISPOSABLE”
As Mussell shows, criminalization and incarceration are not limited to criminal justice and
prisons. Other forms of detention and control are no less invested in keeping “undesirables”
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locked away. Two of the sessions at the symposium tackled specific forms of detention beyond
prisons: psychiatric detention and immigration detention.
People with mental illnesses are often stereotyped as “lacking control” and as dangers to
themselves and others, thus justifying coercive interventions against them, including psychiatric
detention.17 To draw the connection further, in Mad in America, Robert Whitaker notes that
pathologizing labels are more readily applied to poor people and Black people than to anyone
else.18 At the symposium’s session on psychiatric detention, panellist Geoffrey Reaume
compellingly argued that the history of psychiatric detention is not about safety, but about
medical experimentation. Shannon Balfour spoke of their own horrific experiences of being held
in psychiatric detention, including being forced to take medication without being informed about
the side effects, being degraded and given no privacy, and having every aspect of their life
controlled by the facility.
Balfour and Mercedes Perez both concluded in their discussions that so-called
“voluntary” psychiatric detention comes with the threat of criminalization if refused—not even
“voluntary” detention is free from coercion or treated as a non-punitive form of detention. As a
final blow to the popular conception of psychiatric detention as a necessary evil at worst and a
beneficial program at best, Ameil Joseph presented the history of western scientific racism to
show how Black, Indigenous, and racialized people (and particularly women) are pathologized
through the lenses of mental illness and thereby constructed as untreatable and unable to be
rehabilitated. This racism, Joseph argued, is what justifies and underlies psychiatric detention,
not good faith policymaking. For all of these reasons, psychiatric detention belongs in the
purview of abolition.
Similar arguments can be made about immigration detention, and indeed these
connections were made at the symposium panel on the topic by former detainees Ebrahim Toure,
Olu Adetunji, Kimora Adetunji, and refugee lawyer Jared Will. Immigration detention is often
deployed against Black and Brown migrants, stereotyped as “suspicious” or “dangerous” without
so much as a trial or a criminal accusation, 19 further entrenching what, as noted above, Walia
calls the “normative heteropatriarchal whiteness” of Canadian society. 20 Canada’s insistence
upon immigration detention as a tool of indefinite punishment, despite flouting the state’s own
laws and narratives, is examined in this volume by Siena Anstis and Molly Joeck in their
contribution, “Detaining the Uncooperative Migrant.”
Anstis and Joeck situate immigration detention within the state’s control over individual
migrants as an expression of sovereign power. The authors examine how the perceived “nonStephen J Morse, “A Preference for Liberty: The Case against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered” (1982) 70 Cal L Rev 54 at 62. See also: Sophie Nunnelley, “Coercive Care in Civil Mental Health Law:
An Autonomy Lens” (2015) Comparative Program on Health and Society Working Paper Series, 2014–15, available
online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441312> [perma.cc/L239-L4MH]; Michael L Perlin, “On ‘Sanism’” (1993) 46
SMU L Rev 373; Robert Whitaker, Mad in America: Bad Science, Bad Medicine, and the Enduring Mistreatment of
the Mentally Ill (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002). Of course, people with mental illnesses are also subject to
criminal law and penal incarceration for the same reason of being stereotyped as “dangerous” to society at large.
18
Whitaker, supra note 17 at 165.
19
Sandy Hudson & Nora Loreto, “Episode 21: Canada’s racist border policies” (16 May 2018), online: Sandy &
Nora
<https://sandyandnora.com/episode-21-canadas-racist-border-policies/>
[perma.cc/G83W-MG9Z]
at
00h:22m:05s.
20
Walia, supra note 15 at 36.
17
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cooperation” of immigration detainees is used by the Canadian state to justify the indefinite
detention of migrants. Indefinite detention, the authors establish, appears “on its face … contrary
to the Charter and Canada’s international legal obligations.”
Through a rigorous analysis of the underlying legislation and a representative sample of
various immigration review decisions, the authors argue that in fact, there is no clear legal basis
for “non-cooperation” as a justification for continued detention—it does not appear in any
legislation and appears to have been altogether bootstrapped by decision-makers. This invention
of “non-cooperation,” aside from creating “unprincipled” judgments, allows the state to use the
refusal of detainees to participate in their own deportations as justification for punishment
despite the insistence by judges that “immigration detention is non-punitive and must be ‘hinged’
to an immigration purpose.” As a possible solution to this problem, the authors advocate for
three suggestions for legal reform: 1) establishing a clear legal definition of “non-cooperation”;
2) establishing through legislation that indefinite detention is unlawful regardless of “(noncooperation”; and 3) setting an express limit on the length of detention.
Anstis and Joeck are careful to connect this discussion on legal doctrine with the
experiences of detainees—the problem described in this article is not merely that the state has
created “bad law,” but that this “bad law” allows immigration detention to be “used as a
disciplinary tool to coerce capitulation by vulnerable non-citizens to the will of the state,” also
noting that detention has “lasting and serious consequences” on detainees. Whether the proposed
reforms can be understood as abolitionist is an open question, as stronger legal definitions can
strengthen the state’s legal legitimacy while also attempting to restrict the scope of its power.
Nevertheless, throughout the article, the authors shed light upon the ways in which the system
harms detainees, from being subject to degrading comments about their personal behaviour from
judges to the immense physical and mental toll of indefinite detention. In doing so, the authors
remind us that law, detention, and abolition are fundamentally about the people who are affected
by them, at the intersections of criminal punishment and beyond.
The breadth and depth of Canada’s carceral power means that abolition, as a response to
carcerality, cannot be construed narrowly. The abolitionist project is not merely concerned with
the physical existence of prisons, but with the underlying logic of punishment that justifies the
carceral state’s ability (and propensity) to punish, control, target, and criminalize. Indeed, in the
opening session of the symposium, Souheil Benslimane cautioned that even our advocacy
against prisons can be done in a way that “crystallizes the logic of punishment”—even without
prisons, the state can undertake its carceral violence through other means. Prisons are a problem,
but they are not the problem. The panellists in the symposium discussion on remand and bail
(Lou Boileau, Jillian Rogin, and Michael Leitold) made this clear in describing how people out
on bail, no longer physically in detention, are subject to an variety of surveillance mechanisms
that keep people under state control. Even if physical detention changed, the state’s inherently
violent ability to target and criminalize people and exercise punitive control over them would
remain.
This logic of punishment manifests itself in public spaces as well as in our minds and our
interpersonal relationships. In “No One Is Disposable: Towards Feminist Models of
Transformation Justice,” Hannah Barrie reflects on her time volunteering with Circles of Support
and Accountability (COSA), an organization “based on friendship and accountability that helps
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reintegrate [people previously incarcerated for enacting sexual violence] back into communities”
as part of a praxis of transformative justice. Barrie begins by unpacking the term “transformative
justice,” which often presents itself as an “alternative” to prisons and punishment. She
distinguishes transformative justice from both the dominant carceral paradigm (deemed
“retributive justice”) and “restorative justice,” another much-discussed alternative. Retributive
justice focuses on deeming people deserving of punishment and expelling them from
communities. The system chooses who to punish through racism, colonialism, transphobia,
homophobia, and ableism. Transformative justice differs by focusing instead on transforming
relationships “and the social conditions within which they operate.” Barrie quotes Kai Cheng
Thom to say that by placing harm in the context of broader social systems and structures, the
goal of transformative justice is “safety for survivors, transformative justice for perpetrators, and
real healing for all involved”—or, as COSA’s mandate and the title of this article state, “No One
Is Disposable.” This differs in significant ways from “restorative justice,” which is more focused
on restoring individual relationships between perpetrators and receivers of harm.
Barrie contextualizes and evaluates COSA as a model of transformative justice, aided by
autoethnographic reflections scattered throughout the article. Through principles of healing and
community, COSA is able to effect a version of transformative justice with its core members.
However, Barrie warns that COSA’s abolitionist potential is (perhaps severely) limited by a
number of factors, not least of which is that the organization receives funding from the federal
government—in her view, this funding structure renders the organization at least partially coopted by and beholden to state systems, “including police and prisons.” Drawing comparisons
between COSA and another transformative justice organization, Philly Stands Up (PSU), Barrie
concludes by proposing ways forward for movements organizing around truly abolitionist
transformative justice, oriented against Canada’s settler-colonial carceral systems.
A common response to prison abolition is to question how an abolitionist society would
“handle” people who commit violent acts of harm. Barrie’s unpacking of transformative justice,
as well as her reflections on how COSA practises it, proves instructive and thought-provoking.
To Barrie, COSA’s approach is about “[s]upport that creates a relationship of trust, ensuring that
core members want to keep the relationship [between core members and volunteers] intact and
sustain it into the future … COSA regards support as accountability and vice versa.” Through
this form of relationship building and trust, COSA is able to transform “cycles of abuse into
cycles of healing.” The way that COSA’s limitations (including its heteronormativity, its
whiteness, and especially its ties to the police) undermine the principles of transformative justice
“cannot be understated,” but nevertheless its lessons are worth exploring for abolitionist praxis in
other contexts, and to understand the extent to which our own mindsets privilege carceral logics.
In the symposium’s opening session, Sarah Speight remarked that abolition is not as
simple as blinking out the existence of prisons at once—a world without prisons must be built
anew, away from the conditions and logics that are used to justify incarceration. The
“everything” in Gilmore’s assertion that abolition requires that we change “everything” surely
includes our institutions and our systems, but through Barrie’s article we see that it also includes
how we think about punishment and the logics of carceral punishment. COSA’s work and
Barrie’s reflections on transformative justice encourage us to rethink our common paradigm of
criminalization and incarceration as the default responses to harm. They show that another
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world, one in which perpetrators of harm are able to heal and grow, is not merely possible, but is
already taking shape in groups like COSA, PSU and groups that will build upon their models.
Abolition is not a theoretical ideal; it is a praxis that is already happening around us.

III. REFORM AS ABOLITIONIST PRAXIS?: “OUT OF SIGHT,
OUT OF MIND,” “THE JAIL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INFORMATION LINE,” AND “LITIGATION IS JUST ONE
TOOL”
The notion that violence is built into the very nature of prisons and detention is what motivated
us to present a symposium on abolition as opposed to mere reform. Settler-colonialism cannot be
reformed away. There is no policy that can end the oppressive roots of prisons while keeping the
prison system alive. Following this line of argument, even the most luxurious prison with the
kindest guards remains a piece of the state projects of colonial violence. While reforms may or
may not address these issues, abolitionists believe that reforming prisons without an abolitionist
vision only serves to keep the prison system, and its inherent violence, alive.
The (legal) world often turns to reform as the solution to carceral violence. Prisoners on
strike at Folsom Prison in California wrote in their manifesto that prisons are “the fascist
concentration camps of modern America,”21 and against this backdrop, the Canadian carceral
system has the unearned reputation of being reformable simply by virtue of not being the United
States—the United States is commonly seen as “uniquely unjust,”22 or as “the benchmark for …
imprisonment.”23 It helps Canada’s case that it has also implemented reforms throughout the
years that afford the state a veneer of benevolence when it comes to prisons. For example, the
2002 Supreme Court decision in Sauvé v Canada granted prisoners in Canada the right to vote,
whereas prisoner enfranchisement remains a controversial topic in the United States. 24 Other
reforms like 2019’s Bill C-83 seek to soften the carceral state’s impacts on prisoners. When the
harms of incarceration are presented as unintended harms within the system, and not as the
fundamental function of carcerality itself, reforms appear to address abolitionist concerns
without doing away with prisons.
“The Folsom Prisoners’ Manifesto of Demands and Anti-Repression Platform” (3 November 1970) online: San
Francisco Bay View <https://sfbayview.com/2018/10/folsom-manifesto-for-the-california-statewide-prison-strike1970/> [perma.cc/T8AA-GB5U].
22
Jordan House, “Why Canadian Prisoners are Participating in the US Prison Strike” (5 September 2018) online:
Jacobin
<www.jacobinmag.com/2018/09/canada-prison-strike-burnside-jail-incarceration>
[perma.cc/LYW4N3MP].
23
Jody Chan, Lorraine Cheun & Marsha McLeod, “Everything you were never taught about Canada’s prison
systems” (20 July 2017) online: Intersectional Analyst <www.intersectionalanalyst.com/intersectionalanalyst/2017/7/20/everything-you-were-never-taught-about-canadas-prison-systems> [perma.cc/2LMK-QKZH].
24
See Dana Liebelson, “In Prison, and Fighting to Vote” (6 September 2019) online: The Atlantic
<www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/when-prisoners-demand-voting-rights/597190/> [perma.cc/Q4G5BQYK]; Jonah Walters, “Incarcerated People Must Be Heard” (23 March 2020) online: Jacobin
</www.jacobinmag.com/2020/03/incarceration-felony-voting-rights-criminal-justice>
[perma.cc/9HAF-UF3Q];
“Felony Disenfranchisement” (2020) online: The Sentencing Project <www.sentencingproject.org/issues/felonydisenfranchisement/> [perma.cc/NE27-WBBG].
21
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While tempting to look at examples like these as proof that Canadian prisons are not
worthy of concern and are fixable through reform, abolitionists are less concerned with the extent
of violence being enacted upon prisoners, but rather that there is any violence at all. If Canadian
carcerality is inherently a project of racist, settler-colonial violence, reforms that willfully stop
short of ending it can be further investments in violence. Worse, returning to Benslimane’s
comments on “crystallizing the logic of punishment” and Mussell’s conclusion that settlercolonial reforms reproduce colonialism’s violence, reform may even preclude abolition by
affirming the carceral state’s power after modest changes. Having established that abolition is a
matter of praxis first and foremost, can reform ever meaningfully serve as abolitionist praxis?
This question was an undercurrent throughout the symposium, and especially in the panel on
Harm Reduction in Prisons. Panellists Kyle King and Mark Zammit, speaking alongside Emily
van der Meulen and Sandra Ka Hon Chu, highlighted the various failures of reformist “harm
reduction” policies that still leave prisoners without much-needed resources like drug treatment
and healthcare.
These discussions also come to bear in this volume in Lydia Dobson’s, “Out of Sight,
Out of Mind: Bill C-83, Solitary Confinement, and Mental Health.” Dobson examines the use of
solitary confinement (referred to in law as “segregation”) against prisoners with mental health
issues and how Bill C-83 might impact its use. Bill C-83, which amends the Correctional and
Conditional Release Act, addresses the use of solitary confinement at the federal level and Bill 6,
which would amend, once enacted, similar legislation at the provincial level in Ontario, are
compared as reforms that address a similar issue at a similar time. Dobson contextualizes solitary
confinement’s harms through a discussion of the recent suicides of Cleve “Cas” Geddes and
Ashley Smith in solitary confinement, as well as by the excessive amount of time that Christina
Jahn and Adam Capay endured in solitary confinement (200 consecutive days and four years,
respectively). All four of these individuals live(d) with mental health issues, and in the cases of
Smith, Jahn, and Capay, their extended time in solitary confinement flouted Canada’s
international legal obligations vis-à-vis the United Nations’ “Mandela Rules,” which prohibit
solitary confinement exceeding fifteen days, and with respect to prisoners with mental or
physical disabilities, prohibit solitary confinement in any circumstance where the prisoner’s
condition would be exacerbated by such confinement. Bill C-83 and Bill 6 arise from this
context.
While Bill 6 (which has passed, but the Conservative Ontario government has not yet put
in force) outright prohibits the use of solitary confinement against people with mental health
issues, Bill C-83 permits prisoners to be confined in “structured intervention units” for twentyhours per day, so long as they are given a daily visit from a health care professional. If the
professional recommends for health reasons that a prisoner not remain in the structured
intervention unit or that conditions of confinement be changed, a multi-layered bureaucratic
review process is set in motion. At Dobson points out, “[a]t no point in this process is any action
required that would treat the harms caused by solitary confinement.”
Bill 6 sets hard limits on the length of solitary confinement (fifteen consecutive days;
sixty total days in a 365-day period) in accordance with the Mandela Rules and jurisprudence
from the Ontario Court of Appeal, while Bill C-83 only requires a review after thirty days in a
“structured intervention unit.” Government actors have taken the position that Bill C-83
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complies with the Mandela Rules because it ends the practice of solitary confinement, but this
view relies on an exceedingly formalistic interpretation of the Rules that obscures the harms to
prisoners. The Mandela Rules define solitary confinement as confinement for twenty-two hours
or more a day without meaningful human contact. While Bill C-83 requires a minimum of four
hours outside a cell, only two of these hours need entail opportunities to interact, the other two
may be devoid of any “meaningful human contact” as contemplated by the Mandela Rules. In
other words, Bill C-83 does not end solitary confinement. Moreover, as Dobson points out,
reducing hours outside of a cell to twenty “is not likely to dramatically reduce the negative
impacts of solitary confinement on mental health.” Bill C-83 creates “a dangerous precedent in
which solitary confinement ‘under another name’ (structured intervention units) is permitted to
hold prisoners with mental health issues for otherwise unacceptable periods of time.” Bill 6 is far
from perfect, but by comparison, Bill C-83 falls far short. Dobson further advances these
critiques in a line-by-line breakdown of Bill C-83 in conversation with other critiques of Bill C83 made by prison scholars Lisa Kerr and Debra Parkes before concluding that the Bill’s reforms
may “undo many years of advocacy by reorganizing the similar conditions under another name
and falsely concluding that solitary confinement has been eliminated.”
Dobson’s analysis illustrates a common shortcoming of legal reforms: the propensity of
legislators to acknowledge and rename the particulars of the state’s violence without addressing
the harm done. As Dobson shows, despite highly publicized cases demonstrating the danger of
solitary confinement, Bill C-83 may still allow correctional staff to place people with mental
illnesses in solitary confinement for periods exceeding Canada’s international and domestic legal
obligations, all under a veneer of benevolence and progress. While Dobson (and Kerr, in her
symposium comments during a panel on solitary confinement, speaking alongside Gregory
McMaster and Shane Martínez) acknowledges that Bill C-83 might ameliorate certain conditions
for prisoners, the legislature’s failure to end solitary confinement while pretending that they have
by renaming it has the potential to mask the nature and extent of the harm that prisoners face.
This article serves as a cautionary tale about the limits of law reform and how to understand
reforms that fall short of abolition.
This is not to say that reforms are, by rule, never useful. In the symposium’s closing
session, alongside Chris Harris, organizer Naomi Martey urged us to “walk and talk at the same
time” vis-à-vis reforms and abolition—when the harms of incarceration are as drastic as they are
now, we must find ways of changing the current state of affairs as we build toward a world
without prisons. It is to say, however, that reforms must be critically assessed on a rubric that
goes beyond merely tinkering with the mechanisms of incarceration. As Benslimane and Speight
suggested in the symposium’s opening session, one way to think about reform is to ask whether a
particular policy puts more power in the hands of the carceral state, or if it makes incarceration
more difficult to enact.
Benslimane and Speight, along with Justin Piché and Aaron Doyle, further confront these
questions about decarceral reforms in their article for this volume, “The Jail Accountability &
Information Line: Early Reflections on Praxis.” Here, the four authors (who were also the four
panellists in the symposium session on supporting prisoner activism) write about their time
operating the Jail Accountability & Information Line (JAIL), a key organization in Ottawa that
takes phone calls from those imprisoned in the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) to
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connect them with community supports and work with them to address grievances. The authors
discuss the work and origins of the JAIL along with the JAIL’s guiding philosophies. As the
authors explain, the JAIL arose in response to a carceral environment in Ontario forged by
austerity policies and heightened policing of the working class. Recognizing the history and
importance of jail phone lines as a means of communication and support, the JAIL was founded
by members of the Criminalization and Punishment Education Project—namely, the four authors
of this article.
The founding of the JAIL came with a robust understanding of abolition that allowed
them to rigorously question what, exactly, their prisoner support work could look like in a way
that works against the institution of incarceration altogether, and not toward a reformist future of
merely more benevolent incarceration. Their answer to the “abolition versus reform” issue “is
not whether to engage in prison reform, but how to engage in such work while simultaneously
working toward abolition … we ask ourselves what kind of reforms can be enacted to reduce the
harms of incarceration that prisoners experience, while not further consolidating the power to
punish and making our task of dismantling cages more difficult.” The authors go on to discuss
the lessons they learned in the first year of starting and operating the Line, including lessons
about securing space, building the organizing capacity of prisoners and volunteers, and raising
funds.
With questions about reform and abolition settled (for the time being), this look at the
work of the JAIL is a guide to abolitionist praxis that connects the “outside” with the “inside”—
focused not on “helping” prisoners (as the lawyering paradigm often encourages), but instead, as
the authors paraphrase Lilla Watson, recognizing that “‘their liberation is bound up’ in our own.”
The empowerment of prisoners to fight against the systems which oppress them is a crucial part
of the fight for justice everywhere. In this sense, abolition is necessarily bound up in our
collective liberation.
The intense strategizing and philosophizing that underlie the Line’s praxis were on full
display in the summer of 2020, when people imprisoned at OCDC went on multiple hunger
strikes to fight against various grievances, including the lack of Personal Protective Equipment in
the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the lack of nutrition and options for those on Halal diets. 25
The JAIL’s utility as an organizing and public relations tool for prisoners during the strikes
exemplifies their approach to collective empowerment and liberation as outlined in this article.
Having destabilized law reform as an inherently viable avenue for abolition, what is to be
made of the lawyer’s role in abolishing the carceral state? In our Voices and Perspectives
section, Kristen Lloyd interviews lawyer and organizer Karin Baqi, who was co-counsel for the
End Immigration Detention Network (EIDN), who had successfully secured third-party public
interest standing in the case of Brown v Canada at the Federal Court. The case concerned Alvin
Brown, a Jamaican national who arrived in Canada as a small child and attained Permanent
See “Statement on the Hunger Strike at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre” (4 June 2020) online: Tracking the
Politics of Criminalization and Punishment in Canada <http://tpcp-canada.blogspot.com/2020/06/statement-onhunger-strike-at-ottawa.html> [perma.cc/4VZM-8HYE]; “Hunger Strike begins at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention
Centre” (22 July 2020) online: Tracking the Politics of Criminalization and Punishment in Canada <http://tpcpcanada.blogspot.com/2020/07/hunger-strike-begins-at-ottawa-carleton.html>[perma.cc/9RRA-8GKV];
Krisna
Saravanamuttu, “Prisoners hunger strike for better conditions at OCDC” (5 June 2020) online: Spring
<https://springmag.ca/prisoners-hunger-strike-for-better-conditions-at-ocdc>[perma.cc/T558-FH4Z].
25
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Resident status. Years later, having functionally spent his entire life in Canada, he was found
criminally inadmissible under Canada’s immigration legal regime and ordered deported. In the
lead-up to his 2016 deportation, Brown was held in detention by the Canada Border Services
Agency for a total of five years. In Brown v Canada, he challenged the constitutionality of the
legislation that permitted his detention.
Lloyd’s interview with Baqi provides insight on the legal arguments that EIDN and
Brown advanced, namely that the legislation underlying immigration detention in Canada
violates the Charter: the lack of a statutory limit to the length of detention (as discussed
elsewhere in this volume in “Detaining the Uncooperative Migrant”) violates sections 7 and 9;
the lack of any statutory basis for the physical conditions and location of detention violates
section 7; and the resulting indeterminacy of length, conditions, and location is a violation of
section 12. As well, EIDN and Brown argued that the detention review process creates a reverse
onus on detainees to argue for their release instead of the state having to justify detention, and
since the Minister is not statutorily bound to provide evidence, detainees have no way of
knowing the case against them. Ultimately, these arguments were unsuccessful, with the Federal
Court ruling that the legislative regime is constitutional when “properly interpreted and applied”
and the Federal Court of Appeal further affirming that what Brown and EIDN allege are matters
of maladministration as opposed to anything inherent to the regime.
In the latter part of the article, Lloyd examines EIDN’s experience in the context of
ongoing arguments about the role of litigation in social movements: do legal challenges
fundamentally create a reliance upon the state, thus taking power out of the hands of
movements? Can litigation be leveraged as a tool for driving public conversations about
injustice? Despite the judgment, EIDN understood that the legal victory itself was not the only
goal of litigation: their intervention granted them legitimacy in the public sphere, allowing them
to further shape public discourse, and generated media attention and thus a platform for detainees
and family members. At the same time, litigation is resource-intensive and legal arguments are
too narrow to capture the political demands and broader context of movements. Weighing the
pros and cons of EIDN’s intervention in Brown, Lloyd concludes that litigation, for all its virtues
and faults, “must necessarily be only one tool, carefully selected and wielded, in an overall
strategy for change.”
Changing law, as in legislation and jurisprudence, may play a role in the struggle for
abolition. However, between the insights shared from JAIL, EIDN, and other organizations and
authors in this volume, abolitionist praxis is about centring those affected and empowering
us/them to seek liberation from the carceral state and all its related oppressions. The demands of
movements, activists, and organizers cannot be made subordinate to the work of lawyers.

IV. CONCLUSION
Many of us who organized the symposium were frustrated with the lack of engagement with
prisons and carceral spaces in our legal educations, which came to bear in the symposium’s panel
discussion on teaching prison law, featuring Lisa Kerr, Shane Martínez, and Justin Piché. The
Fall 2020 semester will be Osgoode’s first with a course on Prison Law, taught by Martínez,
thanks to tireless student organizing by Matthew Campbell-Williams and Barbara Brown. Prior
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to this, beyond their inevitable nexuses with constitutional law and administrative law, prisons
and other forms of detention are rarely discussed in our classes. Criminal law curricula largely
stop at sentencing.
Statistics Canada reported a daily average of 38,786 adult prisoners in Canada, 14,812
more in remand, and 94,904 more in community supervision programs and probation in 201718.26 All of these people are subject to state action in some or every aspect of their lives. A lack
of awareness about incarceration when it affects hundreds of thousands of people in Canada can
only serve to deprive us—not only as lawyers, but as community members too. If abolition and
carcerality are about “everything,” an unawareness of carcerality is an unawareness of
everything. The lack of engagement with prisons and abolition is the proverbial ever-growing
elephant in the lecture hall.
When we held the symposium, we could not have imagined the uprisings that have
happened around the world in the summer of 2020 following the police killings of George Floyd,
Regis Korchinski-Paquet, Breonna Taylor, Rodney Levi, Chantel Moore, and many other Black
and Indigenous people whose lives and deaths never made it into the public eye. The people on
the streets demanding justice have pushed the abolition of prisons, police, and the carceral state
squarely into the mainstream conversation. These movements have spurred motions to defund
police departments and demands to take police officers out of schools. In this political climate,
abolition cannot be dismissed as an idealistic pipe dream. No longer can anybody claim to be
ignorant of abolition movements, their demands, and their visions. Abolition is calling in a voice
that demands answers, now.
On behalf of the Journal of Law and Social Policy editorial team, we are excited to
present this volume in service of creating a new world.

Statistics Canada, “Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2017/2018” (9 May 2019), online:
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.htm>.
26
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